competitionlaw

For the third time in a space of few years ( Ryanair/AerLingus , Ryanair/Aer Lingus III and Olympic Air/Aegen Airlines ) the European Commission has blocked an airline merger leading to negative effects on competition. And for the second time in a row the Commission thwarted the attempts of Ryanair to purchase its Irish competitor Aer Lingus. What the prohibition decisions of Ryanair/Aer Lingus , Olympic Air/Aegen Airlines and Ryanair/Aer Lingus III appear to have in common is the theory of competition harm relied on by the Commission. The Commission blocked those transactions because of route dominance rather than slot dominance. In other words, the expected negative effects of the banned concentrations on competition were thought to be due to the post-merger dominant position that the parties would have on a number of links. On the other hand, the availability of slots was not a relevant issue in these cases. The airports from which the merging parties operated did not suffer

By a recent commitment decision (Case A442 Assofort/ADR-Servizi Aeroportuali ) the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has closed an investigation against the manager of airport of Rome Fiumicino (FCO), Aeroporti di Roma (ADR). More precisely, ADR was alleged to have abused its dominant position in the market for the provision of access to common and exclusive use facilities necessary to carry out economic activities at FCO. In the ICA view, ADR would have charged excessive prices to Hertz Italiana (Hertz). Hertz through its local agent (DMH) provided low cost innovative rent-a- car services at FCO, labelled Advantage-rent-car (Advantage). Advantage enable clients to make their booking though a dedicated internet site and upon arrival at FCO they are picked up by shuttle buses calling at the parking lots located outside the airport where they can find the cars they have booked. ADR objected to Hertz that in carrying out the Advantage Business it breached the sub-concession contrac