competitionlaw

In the case 2014-FO-07, Télécommunication , the Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA) examined a multi-product rebates scheme implemented by the former Luxembourg telecommunication monopolist, Post Luxembourg (PL). By its 'Integral' package PL committed to apply lower fares for clients that subscribed in the same time to its mobile telephony, fixed telephony and broadband Internet services altogether. The LCA found that such scheme breached Article 102 TFEU and the corresponding Article 5 of the Luxembourg Competition Act and imposed a Euro 2.5 million fine on PL. The LCA followed the effects-based approach set out by the European Commission in its Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU with regard to the tying and bundling practices. First, the LCA found two tying markets in the retail markets for access to fixed telephony and broadband Internet services, both dominated by PL, and a tied market in the more competitive retail market for mobile telephone servi

The European Commission gave the go ahead to the proposed acquisition of Alitalia by Etihad by accepting a slot remedy package offered by the parties ( Case M.7333 ). The Commission examined the competition impact of the concentration with the O & D pair methodology. It found that the only route on which the activities overlapped to the effect to raise competition problem was the Rome-Belgrade route. Indeed on this link only by Alitalia and Air Serbia, which is jointly controlled by Etihad and the Government of Serbia, operated direct flights. Thus, following the implementation of the merger, Etihad would have a monopoly on this route, and the Commission feared that such monopoly might conduce to higher fares and lower quality. It is not clear, however, whether the Commission's competition concerns are only based on the situation of monopoly (market dominance merger ) and/or on the fact that airport of Rome Fiumicino is a congested airport, where there are no available slots

In the Sanità privata nella regione Abruzzo (Healthcare Private Providers) case the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has closed by a non infringement decision an investigation against a number of private healthcare providers that were alleged to have implemented a complex bid rigging practice affecting the market for the provision of health services in the region of Abbruzzo (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato or Italian Competition Authority, decision n. 25155 of 22 October 2014, Case I769, Sanitàprivata nella regione Abruzzo ) . On the basis of the pieces of evidence the ICA could not establish that the conducts of the parties amounted to a prohibited anti-competitive agreement. The facts of the case The ICA started the investigation against Synergo, Villa Serena, Di Lorenzo and Villa Letizia following the receipt of a complaint filed by a competitor. The parties are all managers of nursing homes and holders of the authorization to supply healthcare services

Following suit of the European Commission and other EU national competition authorities, also the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has recently adopted guidelines on the methods of setting fines ( LineeGuida sulla modalità di applicazione dei criteri di quantificazionedelle sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie irrogate dall'Autorità inapplicazione dell'articolo 15 comma 1 della legge n. 287/90 , thereinafter the ICA Guidelines). Unsurprisingly, the ICA Guidelines closely resembles to the 2006 European Commission's Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2(A) of Regulation No. 1/2003 in many aspects. Both the ICA and the Commission adopt a two-step methodology, whereby first the acting authority sets a basic amount of the fine to which set of adjustment factors apply. The ICA Guidelines set out that the basic amount of the fine is calculated on a percentage of the value of sales made in the relevant market made by the condemned firm, wh

In the case C11959 Carrefour/53 Punti Vendita Billa the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has unconditionally cleared, after the I Phase investigation, the acquisition of 53 Billa supermarkets by Carrefour. The decision is a good illustration of the ICA practice to appraise concentrations between retailers. By the notified transaction Carrefour intended to buy from Billa 53 grocery shops with different size, all of them were located in Northern Italy. The ICA identified the relevant product market affected by the concentration in the market for distribution of general food products and non food products. Then it divided this broad market in further segments on function of the type of shops and cross-substitutability among such shops. Therefore, the ICA identified the market of 'superettes', a small department store, including shops lower than 1.500 sq. meter. It also identified the market for 'hypermarkets' including shops with larger than 1.500 sq. meter and th