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Showing posts from March, 2014

The Italian NTV/Fs/High speed trains case: which commitments for margin squeezes practices?

Under EU competition law margin squeeze is an autonomous competition infringement and it occurs when a vertically integrated firm dominant on the upstream market for an input sets its price at such level that competitors on the downstream market cannot compete with the latter. The dominant firm can apply a margin squeeze by setting a high price for the input, charging low prices on the downstream markets, or by combining of the two (Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law, 426). Under Article 9 of EU Regulation 1/2003 firms being investigated by the European Commission for anticompetitive conducts, including margin squeeze, can offer commitments to address the competition problems brought about by their conducts. If the Commission finds the commitments suitable, it makes them binding and closes the investigations without making a formal infringement decision. Similar powers are conferred by the Article 14-ter of the Italian Competition Act n. 297/1990 on the Italian Competition Authorit

The latest Commission’s decision on state aid to airports and airlines

The EU regime for state aid to airport and airlines has been recently overhauled with the new guidelines for state aid to airports and airlines the European Commission adopted in February 2014 ( the 2014 guidelines ; for a short introduction to the new guidelines see here ; and for a first comment see here and here ). Having said that, It may be worth taking stock and have a quick look at the latest aviation state aid cases made by the Commission over the past few months on the basis of the previous guidelines for state aid to airports ( the2005 guidelines ). To start, the Commission assessed the compatibility with the internal market of bilateral agreements concluded by Ryanair with airport managers in the SA.22932 case ( Marseille ProvenceAirport) and in the SA.18855 case ( AarhusAirport ). By these agreements the managers of the airports of Marseille and Aarhus committed to grant Ryanair discounts on airport charges and marketing incentives as well. The Commission found the a

The Italian Competition Authority opens an Article 101 TFEU investigation on multilateral interchange fees for Bill Payment services

The Bancomat consortium regroups the Association of Italian Banks (ABI), many banks and other financial houses providing payment services. The consortium accounts for 80% of the debit cards issued in Italy. Among other things, Bancomat provides Bill Payment services which enable consumers to pay invoices issued by third parties with their debit cards or PagoBancomat cards. The  Bancomat consortium agreed to impose a € 0,10 fee for each transaction carried out through the Bill Payment system. Believing that the Bancomat Consortium when collectively agreed the above fee infringed competition law, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) opened an Article 101 TFEU investigation ( Case I773 ). The agreement by which the members of the Bancomat consortium set the fee for the Bill Payment services amounted to a decision of an association of undertaking falling within Article 101 TFEU. The ICA qualified the contested fee as a Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIF). Under the agreement, the fi

The Italian Competition Authority to investigate an alleged cartel among suppliers of the national rail incumbent

By a decision made on 5 February 2014 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has opened an Article 101 TFEU investigation into bidding rig practices carried out by 12 suppliers of Trenitalia, the incumbent railway undertaking ( Case I759 ). Interestingly, the ICA started the enquiry ex officio on the basis of information emerging from a criminal investigation. The ICA believed that the parties exchanged relevant information and coordinated their conducts with regard to a number of competitive tender procedures organized by Trenitalia in order to select suppliers of spare parts and maintenance services for its rolling stock. the ICA feared that the parties shared the relevant market for supply of goods and services tendered out by Trenitalia by deciding who would submit the winning bid for the tendered contracts. And the documents gathered by the ICA showed that the parties recorded all the contracts awarded to them by Trenitalia. According to the ICA, this recording system was likel