The Italian Competition Authority opens an Article 101 TFEU investigation on multilateral interchange fees for Bill Payment services

The Bancomat consortium regroups the Association of Italian Banks (ABI), many banks and other financial houses providing payment services. The consortium accounts for 80% of the debit cards issued in Italy. Among other things, Bancomat provides Bill Payment services which enable consumers to pay invoices issued by third parties with their debit cards or PagoBancomat cards. The  Bancomat consortium agreed to impose a € 0,10 fee for each transaction carried out through the Bill Payment system.
Believing that the Bancomat Consortium when collectively agreed the above fee infringed competition law, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) opened an Article 101 TFEU investigation (Case I773). The agreement by which the members of the Bancomat consortium set the fee for the Bill Payment services amounted to a decision of an association of undertaking falling within Article 101 TFEU. The ICA qualified the contested fee as a Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIF). Under the agreement, the financial house that receives the payment (acquirer) has to pay the fee to the financial house that issued the card by which the payment was made (merchant). Since the fee collectively agreed applied to every transaction and every financial institution the ICA feared that that arrangement might restrain competition, in particular by reducing the margin of discretion of the providers of payment services to decide their commercial policies.

Incidentally, it may be worth noting that in the Case I720 the ICA found the MIF agreed for the payments made through credit cards to breach competition law. The ICA examined the MIF for MAV payment services in the Case I704. The proceeding was then closed by the ICA with a commitment decision. 

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