The European Commission unconditionally clears the Facebook/WhatsApp merger
By a Phase I
decision the Commission unconditionally approved the Facebook $ 19
billion acquisition of WhatsApp (Case No COMP/M.7217,Facebook/WhatsApp). The
Commission was required by the parties to review the transaction by
means of a reasoned submission filed on the basis of Article 4(5) of
the EU Merger Regulation. Indeed, the merger was not a concentration
with EU dimension within the meaning of Article 1 EUMR falling within
the Commission jurisdiction, since the EU turnover of WhatsApp in
2013 failed to met the financial thresholds in that provision.
The
Commission identified three relevant product markets affected by the
concentration. It restrained the first relevant market, the market
for consumer communication services, to the communication apps for
smartphones, because WhatsApp was available only for this device.
Following its approach in Microsoft/Skype (Case
M.6281), upheld by the General Court in the case T-79/12,
Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission, the
Commission viewed consumer communication service apps as
a recent fast-growing sector, where large market shares might be
ephemeral and not indicative of market power. For the same reason,
the network effects that characterised this market did not constitute
a relevant entry barrier. In addition, the Commission attached much
importance to the multi-homing phenomenon. Communication apps were
available for free download and took up little space on the users'
devices. As a result, consumers could simultaneously use the apps of
the parties and switch to those of rivals as they liked. Finally, the
Commission ruled out that the parties were close competitors on
considering that the functions of their apps were different.
Then the Commission
examined the market for social networking services. It identified the
essential functions of social networking services in the creation of
a public or semi-public profile and a list of friends or contacts as
well as exchanging messages, sharing information, commenting on
posting and recommending friends. The Commission took the view that
social networking services differed from consumer communications apps
as they offered users a richer social experience. However, it
reviewed the merger considering that also consumer communications
apps belonged to the market for social networking services. The
Commission found that the merger would not restrain the competition
on this market on the basis of the following factors. First, there
were many alternative operators, including providers of consumer
communications apps, to which customers could easily switch due to
the extensive reliance on multi-homing. Second, the products of the
parties were not close substitutes since Facebook offered a richer
user experience than WhatsApp. Third, a future integration between
the Facebook and WhatsApp products was unlikely due to significant
technical hurdles.
Finally,
the Commission examined the effects of the merger in market for
online advertising services. It ruled out that the merger would have
anti-competitive horizontal effects because only Facebook operated in
this market. The Commission also ruled out that post-merger Facebook
would have a stronger market position, being able to use the user
data of WhatsApp to introduce
targeted advertising services on the latter or improve its
advertising activities outside WhatsApp. There would be alternative
providers of online advertising services capable to compete with
Facebook. Strong competitors such as Google would have the control
only on murch larger shares of Internet user data than Facebook.
Moreover, reliance on the WhatsApp user data to improve the
advertising services on the Facebook site would require to change the
WhatsApp privacy policy with the risk that WhatsApp users, not
trusting the Faceboook privacy policy, would switch to rivals as some
did in the aftermath of the announcement of the transaction.
Incidentally
in Facebook/WhatsApp
the
Commission
confirmed that merger control should focus only on the economic
effects of merger operations, privacy concerns being outside the
scope of the EUMR. Privacy concerns, on the contrary, were taken into
account by the
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in the competition review of the merger.
Though the FTC cleared the merger, it required the parties to
continue to comply with the privacy policy of WhatsApp (FTC Press
Release of 10 April 2014, FTC Notifies Facebook, WhatsApp of Privacy
Obligations in Light of Proposed Acquisition).
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