competitionlaw

By a decision made on 22 May 2015 the Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA) has aquitted Philharmonie of allegations that would have abused its dominant position in the markets for the organization of concerts and management of concert halls (Case n. 2015-RP-02, Philharmonie , http://www.concurrence.public.lu/fr/decisions/abus-de-position-dominante/2015/decision-2015-rp-02/Decision-n_-2015-RP-02-du-22-5-2015.pdf ) . The Act of 16 December 2011 entrusted the Philharmonie, a public entity, with the following tasks: i) to manage the concert halls assigned to it by the state; ii) to organize cultural events, and iii) to promote the Luxembourg Philarmonic Orchestra. It was alleged that Philharmonie, by acting in the same time as manager of the concert halls assigned to it and as organizer of concerts at such premises, would have an unfair competitive advantage over the other organizers of cultural events. As a result, Philharmonie might abuse of this advantage by refusing to give comp

Forniture Trenitalia is the latest Article 101 TFEU investigation into bid-rigging practices closed by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) with an infringement decision (Decision of 27 May 2015, Case I759, Forniture Trenitalia ). The ICA found that 12 major firms coordinated their behaviours with relation to the competititive tender procedures organized by Trenitalia over the 2008-2011 period for the selection of suppliers of rail equipment and spare parts. In the ICA view, the conducts of the parties amounted to a hard-core cartel by which they agreed to fix prices and allocate market shares. As usual for this type of anti-competitive practices, the parties decided who amongst them would submit the lower winning bid. They implemented the cartels by exchanging sensitive information in different ways and also put in place a monitoring mechanism based on a chart. For each party the chart indicated the contracts awarded to them (credits) and the tendered contracts for which the p

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has recently opened a phase II investigation into a merger in the retail markets for baby products (Case C11982, EnricoPreziosi-Artsana/Newco-Bimbo Store ). The notified concentration includes a number of connected transactions, by which Bimbo Store (BS) is purchased by Giochi Preziosi (GP), which is purchased by Enrico Preziosi. Then, GP and Artsana create a new company (Newco) to which GP, BS and Artsana, holder of the mark Chicco, transfer their baby products retail activities. In the ICA view the notified concentration may have horizontal and vertical anticompetitive effects. To start with, the ICA identified the relevant product markets that appeared to be affected by the concentration in the retail markets for baby products. This market is local in scope with each province being a relevant geographic market. Baby products include a wide range of products which are distributed through several channels, among which, the Baby Store form

Following a complaint filed by La Bomba, a small Italian producer of ice lollies, by the decision made on 4 June 2015 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) opened an Article 102 TFEU investigation against Unilever ( Case A484, Unilever/Distribuzione Gelati ). Unilever was found to enjoy a dominant position in the market for impulse ice-creams, where it was by far the leading player with a 50% market share with a wide range of products that were household names due to its massive ad caimpagns. The ICA feared that Unilever might have abused its dominant position by imposing in the framework agreements concluded with the trade associations regrouping retailers of ice-creams and in the standard distribution agreements concluded with the single retailers a number of exclusivity clauses and rebate schemes that may foreclose competitors. First, by freezer exclusivity clauses Unilever committed to make available to retailers freezer cabinets without any charge upon the condition that re

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has recently launched a sector enquiry into the market for human vaccines out of some concerns about how competition works in this sector (IC50- Mercatidei vaccini per uso umano or Markets for vaccines for human use ). The ICA pointed out that the national health authorities tendentially buy the supplies of vaccines they need through centralized competitive tender procedures. Some local authorithies, however, buy the vaccines from suppliers they choose with single tender procedures that they organize. The likely the result is that the prices paid for by the latter may be different from those paid for the same products by the health authorities that organized centralized tender procedures. In addition, a given vaccine could not be substituted with other medicinal products having a different therapeutic function. Therefore, from a competition law viewpoint each vaccine may constitute a distinct product market. Suppliers of vaccine may have a mono