competitionlaw

Introduction Which technical information can a car manufacturer legitimately refuse to share with independent operators without running the risk of infringing competition law? Withholding such pieces of information may negatively affect competition, foreclosing independent operators that they may not be capable to carry out their economic services due to the lack of access to the information ( Commission notice, Supplementary guidelines   on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles, paras. 62-64). The Conseil de Concurrence de Luxembourg, the Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA), has recently dealt with this question in the B&J Engineering v BMW case (Decision of 26 June 2015 n. 2015-RP-04, B&JEngineering v BMW ). Eventually, the LCA found for BMW. It held that the car manufacturers had no duty to share with indenpedent operators technical information other than those necessary f

This question was referred by the Court of Cassation of Romania to the Court of Justice (CJ) in the Case C-172/14, ING Pensii v Consiliul Concuren ţ ei . The case arose when the Competition Authority of Romania condemned 14 managers of private pension funds, including ING Pensii, for entering into an agreement for sharing clients and ING Pensii challenged the decision before the Romanian judges. The CJ pointed out that agreements for the sharing of customers are amongst the most serious restrictions of competition. Then it went on ascertaining whether the agreement put in place by ING Pensii could be regarded as an object competition restriction. Considering the provisions and the objectives of the agreement as well as the context in which it was concluded, the CJ replied in the affirmative and found that such agreement fell within the scope of Article 101 TFEU. Therefore, the question of how many clients were concerned by that agreement was not a relevant factor to establish whet

It is settled case law that the EU Courts are unwilling to accept the absolute impossibility to recover state aid defence submitted by Member States that have been found by the European Commission to have granted aid in breach of the provisions of the TFEU. EU Courts have indeed adopted a strict interpretation of the concept of impossibility. As a result, to demonstrate to the expected evidentiary standard the impossibility to implement the Commisssion' s decision can be an insurmountable task for a Member States adressee of a recovery order. Unsurprisingly in light of the above, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has recently rejected the pleadings submitted by France, arguing for the impossibility to recover aid previously granted to two ferry companies, SNCM and CMN (CJEU, judgment of 9 July 2015 made in the Case C-63/14 European Commission v France). Following receipt a complaint filed by a competitor, the Commission launched an investigation into the public service

Introduction In the UEFA Champions League case ( Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League [2004] 4 CMLR 9) the European Commission dealt with the issue whether arrangements for the joint selling of TV rights to sporting events breached competition law. The Commission made it clear that joint selling agreements on exclusive basis restricted competition, strenghtening the market position of the incumbent TV operators and hindering the market entry of new media operators. Eventually, the Commission exempted the joint selling arrangements for UEFA Champions League under the then Article 81(3) TFEU upon the condition that UEFA modified the licensing contracts with TV opertors by, among other things, limiting the scope of exclusivity rights awarded to the latter. The idea that absolute exclusivity rights for the transmission of sporting events may be in breach of competition law was recently embraced by Conseil de Concurrence de Luxembourg, the Luxembourg

By a recent decision the Swiss Competition Authority (Comco) has found a cartel in the wholesale market for bathroom fittings (see here and  here ). The Comco started investigation in 2011 following the complaints received by some consumers. It then established that the majority of wholesalers of bathroom fittings agreed to fix prices and limit output for 14 years from 1997 to 2011. Over this period, the parties collectively decided a wide range of factors that were relevant to determine the level of prices to charge on consumers. Such factors included margins, gross prices, Swiss Franc/Euro exchange rates, transport costs and rebate schemes. In addition, the parties also agreed to not distribute the products of manufacurers that did not take part in the collusion. As a reuslt, they parties prevented the entry of new competitors in the market, reducing output. The Comco also found that the trade association of wholesalers of bathroom fittings (Union Suisse des Grossistes de la Br

In Servizi di post-produzione di programmi televisivi-Rai (RaiTV post production services) the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has found that several operators infringed Article 2 of the Italian Competition Act no. 287/90, corresponding to Article 101 TFEU (http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/4881-i771ch-istrsanzomi-x-pubbl.html). The ICA found that the parties put into practice a single complex anti-competitive agreement to regulate their bidding for the service contracts tendered out by RAI and fix prices to be charged on RAI. The agreement was implemented in two phases. In the first phase, which took place in the 2011-summer 2013 period, the trade association NIBA played a pivotal role. NIBA was created with the purpose to enable its members to withstand to the new aggressive policies of RAI aiming at imposing lower prices on its suppliers. The parties exchanged sensitive information through NIBA, that also recommended to their members which prices to offer t