The Swiss Competition Authority finds a cartel in the wholesale market for bathroom fittings

By a recent decision the Swiss Competition Authority (Comco) has found a cartel in the wholesale market for bathroom fittings (see here and here). The Comco started investigation in 2011 following the complaints received by some consumers. It then established that the majority of wholesalers of bathroom fittings agreed to fix prices and limit output for 14 years from 1997 to 2011. Over this period, the parties collectively decided a wide range of factors that were relevant to determine the level of prices to charge on consumers. Such factors included margins, gross prices, Swiss Franc/Euro exchange rates, transport costs and rebate schemes. In addition, the parties also agreed to not distribute the products of manufacurers that did not take part in the collusion. As a reuslt, they parties prevented the entry of new competitors in the market, reducing output.
The Comco also found that the trade association of wholesalers of bathroom fittings (Union Suisse des Grossistes de la Branche sanitaire, USGBS) played a key role in the implementation of the cartel. Almost all the parties were also members of UAGBS. The only party to the cartels that was not member of the trade association was Sanitas Troesch, a leading player in the relevant market.

The Comco imposed on USGBS and 10 wholesalers fines totalling up to CHF 80 million. Some of the parties were granted fine reduction for having supplied Comco with relevant evidence about the anti-competitive agreement. A further fine reduction was granted following the application of the attenuating circumstance that previous investigations into the wholesale market for bathroom fittings had been closed with a non-infringement decision.

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