competitionlaw

Pursuant to the special powers conferred on it by the Law Decree 347/2003 as amended by the Law Decree 134/2008, the Italian Government authorized the Alitalia/CAI merger on the basis of prevailing national interests. The Italian Competition Authority(ICA) was thus deprived of its regulatory jurisdiction on the transaction. As the merging parties were the national flag carrier, Alitalia, and one of its next competitor, Air One, the merger was likely to lead to monopoly or quasi monopoly position on many routes, and in particular on the very profitable Milan Linate (LIN) -Rome Fiumicino (FCO). Nevertheless, the Government granted a three-year antitrust immunity to the Alitalia/CAI merger. Therefore, the ICA could only impose behavioral remedies in order to mitigate the expected serious anticompetitive effects of the merger. Since the three year period of immunity expired on 3 December 2011, at the beginning of December 2011the ICA started an investigation into the Alitalia/CAI merger in...

By a decision made on 22 September 2011 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has unconditionally cleared an airline merger, the Meridiana acquisition of Air Italy, in spite of the very high market shares the parties had on some overlapping routes ( Case C11167, Meridiana-Azionisti Air Italy/Air Italy Holding-Meridiana Fly ). On the basis of the traditional city pair method the ICA found that the merged carrier would have a 70-80% market share on the Olbia-Napoli route and quasi monopoly position with a 90-95% market share on the Olbia-Torino and Verona-Napoli routes. Nevertheless, the ICA believed that the transaction would have not created any competition problems because the dominant position of the merger carrier was contestable. New operators were able to start links competing with Meridiana and Air Italy as there were no entry barriers enter. In fact none of the airports connected by the examined routes were congested and subjected to the coordination regime. Therefore any...

The Italian Competition Authority has blocked the Compagnia Valdostana delle Acque (CVA) acquisition of two regional energy firms, Deval and Vallernergie ( decision n. 22683 of 4 August 2011, Case C11082, CVA-Compagnia Valdostana delle Acque/Deval-Vallenergie) . The ICA found that the proposed transaction would have given CVA a quasi monopoly position in some electricity markets in the northernmost region of Valle d’Aosta, namely in the market for low-voltage retail energy sales to domestic clients and in the market for sales to non-domestic clients. CVA was active in the market for power generation and in the wholesale and retail markets for sales of electricity in the Valle d’Aosta region. With the notified merger CVA intended to buy 51% of share capital in two Valle d’Aosta-based power operators, Deval and Vallenergie from Enel, the Italian electricity incumbent operator. Deval traded in the market for distribution of power, while Vallenergie supplied power to domestic clients. ...

By a recent decision (Case C11072, Moby/Toremar ) the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has conditionally cleared the Moby acquisition of the ferry operator Toremar. Toremar, a ferry operator controlled by the Region of Tuscany, was entrusted to provide maritime links from Tuscany to the Island of Elba and other minor islands off the Tuscany coast under a regime of public service obligation. Moby submitted the winning bid in a public tender procedure organized by the Region of Tuscany to select to whom sell Toremar. The ICA opened an investigation into the Moby acquisition of Toremar, because also Moby was active in the maritime routes between Tuscany and Elba, and some of its routes overlapped with those of Toremar. In particular, the ICA found competition problems with the Piombino-Portoferraio route. Post-merger, Moby would have a quasi monopoly position on this route, the only other competitor, Blu Navy, having a very small market share. Furthermore, Moby and Toremar togethe...

The decision of the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) in the Sapec Agro/Bayer-Helm (Case A415) is a rare case of Article 102 TFEU condemnation. Bayer Cropscience (BCS) was accused for having refused to grant some of its competitors access to toxicology studies in its possession on fosetyl. The BCS had as effects its competitors having to exit the market for the plant health products based on fosetyl. Indeed, the regulatory regime in force subjected the granting of market authorization for plant health products based on fosetyl to the production of toxicology studies on the effects of this substance. The ICA rejected the commitments offered by BCS and found that BCS had to grant its competitors access to the studies, because the studies constituted essential facilities. Therefore the ICA fined € 5.124.359,00 BCS for abuse of dominant position in the market for the production and commercialization of fosetyl-based fungicides. The most noteworthy aspect of Sapec Agro/Bayer-Helm i...

The UK Competition Commission (CC) has unconditionally cleared the Stena/DFDS merger. This relevant market affected by the transaction was the market for ferry services between Ireland and Great Britain. At the moment of the merger it was a declining market with all the ferry operators losing market shares because of the recession. So there existed an oversupply of capacity. The merger pursues the reorganization of the ferry services provided by the parties with Stena replacing DFDS on Liverpool-Belfast and Heysham-Belfast routes and closing two Dublin-base routes. Moreover, at the same time of the merger, Stena closed its Fleetwood-Larne route. What is of relevance in the CC decision is the counterfactual it identified. Counterfactual – what would happen if the merger does not take place- is an important step to ascertain the competition impact of the merger, and it should be carefully identified. According to the Merger Assessment Guidelines , one of the cases in which it is po...