Rome sightseeing tours are not public transport services

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has ruled out that the Rome’s sightseeing tours operated with double-decker open buses are local public transport services (AGCM, decision n. 19627, case SP109, Trambus/Attività Autobus di Linea GT, Boll. 10/2009, http://www.agcm.it.) The question arises in the context of art. 8 (2 bis) of the Italian Competition Act n. 287/90 that obliges undertakings which, by law, are entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or operate on in a monopoly situations to carry out economic activities on markets other than those reserved to them through separate companies.
Since 2000 Trambus, a subsidiary of the Municipality of Rome to which is entrusted the provision of 80% of the Rome’s public transport services, has operated sightseeing tours first directly then through its subsidiary Trambus Open. Contrary to what prescribed by art. 8 (2ter) of the Act 287/90 Trambus it did not notify the ICA the setting up of a separated company for the carrying out of sightseeing tours. It considered sightseeing tours as services of public transport and it had been already granted a concession for the provision of such services. Such view was grounded on the sightseeing tours being expressly categorized as local public transport services and, accordingly as services of general economic interest, in some resolutions of the municipality of Rome and the regional law of Latium n. 30/98.
Yet, according to the ICA, the operation of sightseeing tours does not constitute a service of general economic interest since neither specific obligation of public services have been imposed nor the activity at hand has been statutorily reserved to a given entity. That sightseeing tours have been qualified as public services by local public entities is not relevant or the purpose of art. 8 (2bis).
In conclusion, Trambus was found liable to not have communicated to the ICA the incorporation of a new company trading in competitive markets and was penalized by a 15,000 Euro fine.

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