Microsoft/Skype: Do mergers to monopoly in dynamic markets have negative effects on competition?
In the recent judgment in the case T-79/12, Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission , the EU General Court (GC) dealt with the issue of the relevance of the market shares to ascertain the competition effects of merger operations in dynamic markets. Under the EU merger control regime, the market shares enjoyed by the merging parties are generally among the most important factors to be considered when assessing the competition impact of a notified transaction. According to the decisional practice of the European Commission, when the combined market shares of the parties are more than 50% the merged entity is presumed to have a dominant position in the relevant markets. If it is the case, concerns arise about whether the merger may restrain competition. Yet market shares are not always a correct proxy for the market power of the merged entity as reflected by the decisions of the Commission by which in some cases it cleared the notified merger in spite of the high market shares of the ...