competitionlaw

By a decision made on 12 January 2015 the the Swiss Competition Authority (Comco) has opened an investigation against several firms operating in the gravel and landfill sectors in the Canton of Bern. In particular, the Comco focused on two types of anti-competitive conducts. First, the Comco took the view that the parties agreed to fix prices and limit output. Second, the parties enjoyed a dominant position in these markets, which they abused in several ways. On the basis of the pieces of evidence collected, the allegedly abusive practices included refusal to supply third parties, discrimination against customers and making the conclusion of contracts conditional upon the customer's accepting not requested services. It is not clear from the press release of the Comco whether the second type of anti-competitive conducts amounted to a collective abuse of dominance as it seems to be the case. 

By a decision made on 18 December 2014 in the Case 14-D-19 , the French Competition A uthority (FCA) found many manufacturers to have put in practice a cartel in the market for home care products, imposing fines totalling up to € 345,2 million, and also a cartel in the market for personal care products for which the FCA levied a total of € 605,9 fines. The FCA started the investigation following a leniency application filed by three firms which were granted full immunity or fine reductions as they informed the FCA of the existence of the anti-competitive agreements. Further fine reductions were granted on the basis of the negotiated settlement procedure. The relevant product markets were all highly concentrated and the products concerned were 'must have products'. The FCA found that the cartelists coordinated their behaviours in a particularly sophisticated way. The cartelists arranged meetings in restaurants and also exchanged mail at their private homes. In this way the ...

By a II-Phase decision the European Commission has unconditionally cleared the proposed acquisition of the Shell's Harburg refinery assets by Nynas by applying the failing firm defence (FFD) to an unprofitable division and also taking into account the economic efficiencies expected from the merger (Case No COMP/M.6360, NYNAS/Shell/Harburg Refinery). The failing firm defence under EU Competition Law Under the EU Merger Regulation the FFD may be invoked by the parties to an otherwise problematic merger to have that transaction cleared, when there are no causal links between the merger and the deterioration of competition. The Commission has crafted a three-limb test that sets out the three cumulative criteria that must be met in order for the FFD to apply: i) the firm would in the near future exit the market due to financial difficulties unless taken over by another firm; ii) there is no alternative purchase than the notified merger; and iii) in the absence of the merger, t...

The Regional Administrative Court of Latium (Tar Lazio) has recently uphold all the rulings of the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) inits decision in the Roche/Novartis case. The ICA imposed on Roche and Novartis a fine of Euro 180 million for an anti-competitive practice breaching Article 101 TFEU. Roche and Novartis discouraged the off-label use of Avastin to treat glaucoma pathologies in favour of the much more expensive Lucentis by alleging that such use of Avastin was risky. Roche and Novartis challenged the ICA decision before the Tar Lazio that rejected the appeal. In the view of the Tar Lazio, the ICA based its findings on many internal documents of the parties showing that they implemented a strategy of differentiation of Lucentis and Avastin. Their goal was to persuade health professionals that the off-label intravitreal use of Avastin was risky for patients. In this way the parties promoted the use of the on-label Lucentis drug to the detriment of the cheaper A...

So, what do classic Western movies and competition law enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector have in common? Probably not so much. Watching Western movies through the lenses of a competition law geeks, the typical plots of those movies pitted colonies going to West to expand into new markets against Redskins that tried to prevent the market entry of those new operator. Alike, in competition investigations so far conducted in the pharmaceutical sector, drug originators are found to have frustrated or prevented the market entry of generics. Yet, the IncrementoPrezzo Farmaci Aspen (Aspen) recently opened by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) departed from typical scenarion. Indeed, in Aspen the ICA started a n Article 102 TFEU investigation against Aspen, a South African manufacturer of generic drugs, alleging that it had imposed excessive prices on the national health system. Aspen was found to have a dominant position in the markets of anti-cancer drugs based on the act...

In the case 2014-FO-07, Télécommunication , the Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA) examined a multi-product rebates scheme implemented by the former Luxembourg telecommunication monopolist, Post Luxembourg (PL). By its 'Integral' package PL committed to apply lower fares for clients that subscribed in the same time to its mobile telephony, fixed telephony and broadband Internet services altogether. The LCA found that such scheme breached Article 102 TFEU and the corresponding Article 5 of the Luxembourg Competition Act and imposed a Euro 2.5 million fine on PL. The LCA followed the effects-based approach set out by the European Commission in its Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU with regard to the tying and bundling practices. First, the LCA found two tying markets in the retail markets for access to fixed telephony and broadband Internet services, both dominated by PL, and a tied market in the more competitive retail market for mobile telephone servi...

The European Commission gave the go ahead to the proposed acquisition of Alitalia by Etihad by accepting a slot remedy package offered by the parties ( Case M.7333 ). The Commission examined the competition impact of the concentration with the O & D pair methodology. It found that the only route on which the activities overlapped to the effect to raise competition problem was the Rome-Belgrade route. Indeed on this link only by Alitalia and Air Serbia, which is jointly controlled by Etihad and the Government of Serbia, operated direct flights. Thus, following the implementation of the merger, Etihad would have a monopoly on this route, and the Commission feared that such monopoly might conduce to higher fares and lower quality. It is not clear, however, whether the Commission's competition concerns are only based on the situation of monopoly (market dominance merger ) and/or on the fact that airport of Rome Fiumicino is a congested airport, where there are no available slots ...