competitionlaw

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has recently opened a phase II investigation into the proposed merger between two telecommunication tower operators (CaseC11987, EI Towers/Ray Way ). By the notified transaction EI Towers (EIT), wholly owned by the general TV broadcaster Mediaset, plans to buy Ray Way, controlled by the Italian public broadcaster Rai. The parties own networks to host television and radio transmission equipments. The ICA feared that post-merger EIT would have a dominant position in the market for the facilities for television and radio transmissions. With the implementation of the merger the only operator capable to exert a reliable competition pressure on EIT would exit the market. Indeed, the networks owned by the parties could not be replaced with the facilities owned by local competitors. In addition, taking into account that EIT is vertically integrated with the TV broadcaster Mediaset, the ICA also believed that the merger might restrain competition i...

By a recent decision the Swiss Competition Authority (Comco) has found that three firms had cartelized the market for cleaning of road tunnels in the 2008-2013 period. The parties coordinated their conducts by exchaning sensitive information with regard to the competitive tender procedures organized by the regional contracting authorities to select the providers of the cleaning services. In this way the parties established in advance who among them would submit the winning bid for a given tendered out contract. Interestingly, all the parties invoked the leniency regime adopted with the Ordinance of 12 March 2004 ( Cartel Act Sanctions Ordinance , http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/251.5.en.pdf ). ISS Kanal Service that was the first to blew the whistle was granted full immunity, while the other two cartelists, Franz Pfister and Maschinelle Reinigungs, which applied later for leniency, were granted substantial fine reduction to the effect that the total amount of fines levied on them ...

In the case I765, GareGestioni Fanghi in Lombardia e Piemonte , the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) found five firms operating in the market for the depuration of muds resulting from urban sewage to have put in practice a cartel. The parties agreed to coordinate their conducts with regard to a number of competitive tender procedures organised by local authorities in the regions of Lombardy and Piedmont in the 2008-2013 period to select the supplier of depuration services. The bid-rigging agreement has been implemented in two ways. First, the parties sought to find a legally binding mechanism to make their coordination stronger, and namely a joint-venture or a consortium. Second, they exchanged data regarding their bidding for the tendered out contracts. Interestingly, one of the parties submitted as defensive arguments that it did not made joint bids with the others and that it withdrew from the talks about creating a consortium. The ICA, however, discarded these arguments. ...

By a recent decision made in the Case I689C the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) found that several ferry operators providing transport passenger services across the Gulf of Naples and the Gulf of Salerno, plus some joint ventures set up by them and a trade association infringed Article 101 TFEU in two ways. First, the parties did not comply with the commitments they gave to the ICA to close a previous Article 101 investigation concerning a market share agreement for some maritime links in the Gulf of Naples. Following several complaints filed by passengers, the ICA reopened the investigation it had closed with a commitment decision in October 2009. Then it found that the parties were replicating the same anti-competitive conducts, in the shape of coordination of their commercial policies and operative strategies, the ICA had detected in the previous investigation opened in 2008. Second, the ICA found that the parties breached Article 101 TFEU with a further anti-competitive...

By a Phase I decision the Commission unconditionally approved the Facebook $ 19 billion acquisition of WhatsApp ( Case No COMP/M.7217,Facebook/WhatsApp) . The Commission was required by the parties to review the transaction by means of a reasoned submission filed on the basis of Article 4(5) of the EU Merger Regulation. Indeed, the merger was not a concentration with EU dimension within the meaning of Article 1 EUMR falling within the Commission jurisdiction, since the EU turnover of WhatsApp in 2013 failed to met the financial thresholds in that provision. The Commission identified three relevant product markets affected by the concentration. It restrained the first relevant market, the market for consumer communication services, to the communication apps for smartphones, because WhatsApp was available only for this device. Following its approach in Microsoft/Skype (Case M.6281), upheld by the General Court in the case T-79/12, Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission, the Com...

By a commitment decision made on 16 January 2015 the Conseil de Concurrence de Luxembourg or Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA) has recently closed an investigation into abusive conducts carried by the Municipality of Luxembourg (Case n. 2015-E-01, Pompes Funèbres ) By a regulation enacted in June 2014 the Municipality of Luxembourg (the Municipality) reserved to itself the provision of transport services of corpses within the municipal territory and towards the graveyards managed by the Municipality, with the exception of transport services having the origin in a different municipality. In other words, the June 2014 Regulation gave the Municipality a monopoly on transport services within its territory. The LCA started the investigation against the Municipality, following the receipt of a complaint filed by a trade association. The LCA applied the functional approach developed under EU law to establish whether the Municipality qualified as an undertaking, thereby being subject ...

By a decision made on 12 January 2015 the the Swiss Competition Authority (Comco) has opened an investigation against several firms operating in the gravel and landfill sectors in the Canton of Bern. In particular, the Comco focused on two types of anti-competitive conducts. First, the Comco took the view that the parties agreed to fix prices and limit output. Second, the parties enjoyed a dominant position in these markets, which they abused in several ways. On the basis of the pieces of evidence collected, the allegedly abusive practices included refusal to supply third parties, discrimination against customers and making the conclusion of contracts conditional upon the customer's accepting not requested services. It is not clear from the press release of the Comco whether the second type of anti-competitive conducts amounted to a collective abuse of dominance as it seems to be the case.