Oh no, you again!

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has recently decided to open investigations into an abusive conducts allegedly carried out by Ferrovie dello Stato, the Italian incumbent railway undertaking upon receipt of written complaint filed by a new entrant, Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV) (see case A409, www.agcm.it">
With the approaching of the opening of the new Italian high speed rail network, NTV is planning to launch an extensive web of high speed train services competing with Trenitalia, the train operator fully owned by Ferrovie dello Stato. To this end, NTV asked to Rete Ferroviaria Italiana, the infrastructure manager also fully owned by Ferrovie dello Stato access to the maintenance and technical centre of Naples and to station buildings. These assets can be found in the second list of Annex II of the EC Directive 2001/14. Under Article 5 of the directive, infrastructure manager grants track access to services facilities and supplies the services indicated in the list on non-discriminatory basis provided that there are no viable alternatives under market conditions.
Ferrovie dello Stato did not promptly replied to the NTV request, and up to now it did not yet. The ICA believes that access to the above facilities may be indispensable for NTV to organize its activities. Therefore the delaying conduct of Ferrovie dello Stato may frustrate the entry of a new operator in the market and harm consumers. Ferrovie dello Stato has dominant position in the markets for access to rail infrastructure and for high speed passenger transport services. Thus, the ICA opened a procedure for alleged infringement of Article 82 EC.
Let’s have a look again at the facts of the case. NTV will provide transport services on the new high speed network. To this aim, NTV has already bought a fleet of AGV, the latest class of Alstom high speed trains family. Facing the entry of a likely fierce competitor, which directly threats the most profitable share of rail market, Ferrovie dello Stato allegedly reacted with delaying tactics aimed at postpone the starting of NTV oerations.
These facts resemble what happened in GVG/FS, a case decided some time ago by the European Commission ( case COMP/37.685). GVG, a small German train operator, intended to provide a train passenger service linking Switzerland with Milan. To this end, it asked Ferrovie dello Stato, among other things, access to the Italian rail network owned by the latter. After a while, Ferrovie dello Stato refused access. The case was finally settled with the commitment of Ferrovie dello Stato to grant GVG access to rail and share with it its pool of locomotives.

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