The Italian Competition Authority opens an investigation into an alleged abuse of dominant position into the maritime transport market

An Italian ferry operator Grandi Navi Veloci (GNV) is alleged to have abused its dominant position in the market for regular maritime transport services of passengers and road vehicles operated with “roll on-roll off” or “Ro-Pax” ships between the ports of Genova, Genova Voltri and Vado Ligure, on one hand, and the Sicilian ports of Palermo and Termini Imerese, on the other hand. The Italian Competition Authority or ICA started investigations following a complaint detailing the GNV abusive conducts filed by T-Link, a ferry operator which recently started the Genova Voltri-Termini Imerese link in competition with the routes already operated by GNV (A417, T-Link/Grandi Navi Veloci).
In particular, GNV would have carried out the following anticompetitive conducts:
• it applied loyalty discounts selectively targeted at T-Link's clients;
• it strategically increased offers for the transport of commercial road vehicles in a period of the year- summer 2009- when demand is falling with the aim of reducing T-Link's revenue;
• it applied predatory prices as suggested by the fact that GNV by applying the above discounts outpriced T-Link, although the latter has lower production costs;
• it applied worse commercial conditions to undertakings which continued being supplied by T-Link as a reprisal;
• it denigrated the T-Link operations.
The ICA so believes that GNV would have abused the dominant position it enjoyed due to a 90% market share and entry barriers, with the aim to close T-Link off the market. The deadline by which the ICA shall close investigation is 28 October 2010.

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