The French Competition Authority started on its own initiative an enquiry into the competition impact of category management

According to the European Commission’s definition, category management is an agreement by which, within a distribution agreement, the distributor entrusts the supplier or category captain with the marketing of a category of products.
It is still uncertain which effects on competition category management may have. On one hand, it may improve economic efficiency by enabling producers to have a better understanding of consumers' needs. On the other hand, such agreement may drive category captains’ competitors off the market. Moreover, category management allows exchange of sensitive data which may facilitate collusion between producers or between producers and supermarket chains.
The US antitrust community has already examined the above issues and the US antitrust authorities had already dealt with category management in the US Tobacco and Gruma Corporation cases.
Across the Atlantic also the debate on the competition impact of category management is gaining momentum with the European Commission having illustrated its position in the newly minted Guidelines for the assessment of vertical restraints.
Recently, also the French Competition Authority (FCA) joined the party by starting on its own initiative, with a self-referral for an opinion, an enquiry into the possible impact of category management on competition. The FCA will focus on the criteria by which distributors choose the category captain with whom to enter into a category management agreement; the FCA will consider the situation when a supplier assumes the role of category captain with respect to many distributors. Finally, the FCA will try to establish under which conditions and to which extent category management may lead to a standardization of the commercial policies of the participating producers and distributors.

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