The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) opened two investigations into the maritime transport industry.

The Italian maritime transport industry, especially ferry services between continental Italy and islands, is about to go through a thorough process of reorganization with the disappearance of Tirrenia, the long ailing publicly held incumbent ferry operator that will be soon divested by the Government. Unsurprisingly, the sector has attracted the attention of the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) which opened two investigations.

First, the ICA started an Article 101 TFEU investigation into alleged price-fixing practice on the market for Italy and Sardinia maritime links (Autorità Garante del Mercato e della Concorrenza, decision of 11 May 2011, Case I743, Tariffe Traghetti Sardegna- Sardinia Ferries Fares). The ferry operators that are alleged to take part to this practice are Moby, Grandi Navi Veloci (GNV), SNAV and Forship active with the brand of Corsica Sardina Ferries (CSF). In other words, the parties are all the major ferry operators on the Sardinia-continetal Italy routes but for Tirrenia. The links affected by the alleged price-fixing practice the Civitavecchia-Olbia/Golfo Aranci, Genova-Olbia, Livorno-Olbia/Golfo Aranci and Genova/Porto Torres. The ICA noted that the parties increased their 2011 summer season fares by 90-110% in order to face – so they contended - the rising fuel prices. However, what raised the ICA suspicion is that no such fare increase can be found with regard to Sicily-continental Italy routes also operated by many of the parties.

Second, the ICA opened a Second Phase investigation into the proposed acquisition of Toremar by Moby (Autorità Garante del Mercato e della Concorrenza, decision of 8 June 2011, Case C11072, Moby/Toremar). Toremar was the Tuscany subsidiary of Trrenia and provides for ferry links between Tuscany and the Island of Elba and other minor islands off the Tuscany coast. Toremar was transferred to the Regional Authority of Tuscany under the liquidation and privatization procedure of Tirrenia. Then the Region of Tuscany organized a public tender procedure to select the entity to whom sell Toremar. Moby made the winning bid. However, the Moby acquisition of Toremar is likely to give rise to competition problems due to the fact that these two companies operate two overlapping links between Tuscany and Elba: Piombino-Portoferraio and Piombino-Cavo-Portoferraio.

Following the implementation of the proposed merger, Moby would be the monopolist operator on Piombino-Cavo-Portoferraio link, while a duopoly would result on the Piombino-Portoferraio route, with the competitor of Moby-Toremar having a small market share post-merger.

Entry of new competitors in the post-merger market is unlikely due to physical (the lack of docks) and administrative (the discretionary power of Port Authorities to grant port access to ferry operators) barriers.

In conclusion, it can be said that the merging parties are expected to submit convincing remedies in order to have the merger cleared by the ICA.

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