The Italian Competition Authority opens an Article 102 TFEU investigation on the high speed rail market (FS v NTV)

Currently, two train operators, Trenitalia belonging to the previous rail monopolist, the Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) group, and from April 2012, NTV compete on the Italian trucks to run high speed trains. By several complaints filed with the Italian Competition Authority (ICA), NTV reported that FS would put in place a complex exclusionary strategy aimed at hampering the NTV activities. Thus, by a decision made on 22 May 2013, the ICA started an investigation against FS on whether it had abused its dominant position by foreclosing the market for high speed rail passenger services. More precisely, the conducts reported by NTV affected the market for access to the national rail network, the market for the management of advertising spaces inside the main Italian stations and the market for high-speed passenger rail transport services. The anticompetitive conducts that FS has been alleged to have carried out have been divided by the ICA into three groups:
a) Exclusionary behaviours
First, FS would have engaged in a margin squeeze practice resulting from the access fees levied on NTV and the fares charged by Trenitalia in the downward market for passenger services as result of which the NTV trains were unprofitable. Second the rail manager, RFI, also controlled by FS, would have refused to grant NTV morning peak times train paths at the station of Rome. Third, RFI would denied NTV without any objective justification access to the maintenance centre of Milano San Rocco.
b) Discriminatory behaviours
First and second, NTV complained that RFI and the manager of the rail stations, Grandi Stazioni, also being part of the FS group, did not reply to the NTV request to place information displays and desks as well ticket machines in a number of stations at which its trains called. Third, according to NTV, in many stations of the high speed rail network, RFI and Grandi Stazioni refused to make available for NTV advertising spaces through which promote its services.  
c) Inefficiency in the management of rail stations served by NTV
Finally, NTV pointed to a number of inefficiencies affecting the RFI managing of a number stations part of the NTV network. The complained inefficiencies consisted of the RFI delays in carrying out the necessary works to improve and strengthen passenger facilities.
The ICA took the view that the above FS conducts might be considered as part of a complex abusive strategy that might have a serious competition impact as it targeted NTV in the delicate phase of start-up. The deadline to conclude the investigations is 14 July 2014. FS/NTV is the last episode of the saga opposing the railway undertakings since NTV decided to compete with Trenitalia in the high speed rail business. Additionally, in FS/NTV the ICA has the opportunity to take position on the obligations for rail incumbents set out in the EU rail sector regime, and in particular on which elements of the rail facilities they have to share with competitors.

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