The Italian Competition Authority detects a collusion in the market for the recycle of urban waste

By the decision made on 29 July 2015 in the case I784 Ecoambiente the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has fined four firms operating in the market for the recycle of urban waste for having entered into an anticompetitive agreement prohibited by Article 2 of the Italian Competition Act, corresponding to Article 101 TFEU.
The ICA the investigation following the receipt of a complaint reporting the alleged collusion. It found that with the agreement the parties coordinated their behaviour with regard to the competitive tender procedures launched by Ecoambiente in 2013 to select the suppliers of a number of recycle services of urban waste to carried out in the province of Rovigo in Northeastern Italy. In this way the parties fixed the prices for the provision of the services and allocated the tendered contracts among them. The ICA based the finding of this bid-rigging practice on the parallel conducts of the parties as well as on a number of the contacts that took place between the colluders. The ICA noted that, though all the parties qualified for bidding in all the tenders, each of them submitted a bid only for a contract. Moreover, they quoted very similar prices sligthly lower than that indicated in the tender notice. The ICA also found out a number of contacts between the parties in the sensitive period between the call for tenders and the deadline by which to bid for the contracts. Finally, the partied failed to provide any reliable explanation for their conducts with the result that the ICA took the view that the parallel behaviours of the parties was the result of a collusion.
In conclusion, the ICA saw the anticompetitive agreement as a very serious competition infringement and imposed on the parties fines totally amounting to € 1.181.516,00. Ecoambiente confirms the ICA tough enforcement approach with regard to collusive tendering affecting the choice of providers of public services.


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