Centre de Musique Amplifiées et ETIX LLC : The Luxembourg Competition Authority rules out that an internet distributor of tickets for cultural events carried out abusive conducts

In the Centre de Musique Amplifiées et ETIX LLC (CMA-Etix) case the Luxembourg Competition Authority (LCA) has recently closed an antitrust investigation into the market for the sale of tickets for cultural events with a non-infringement decision [1]. According to the complaint filed by an undisclosed person to the LCA, Centre de Musique Amplifiées (CMA), a non-profit entity, consistently entrusted to ETIX LLC (Etix), a-US based company active in the on-line ticketing service sector, the organization of cultural events at the Rockhal, a music hall complex owned by CMA. The complainant reported that Etix was the only distributor for such tickets and that in the case of the ‘Varekai’ show of the ‘Cirque du Soleil’ the ticket fees charged by Etix were excessive.
The relevant product market was identified by the LCA in the market for the service for the distribution of the tickets for shows. The geographic dimension of that market coincided with the so-called Grande Région. The issues addressed by the LCA in CMA-Etix case was whether CMA relied only on Etix for the distribution of the tickets for the shows directly run by the former; and whether Etix had a monopoly position in the relevant market, thus being free to set the ticket fees. The LCA carried out an examination of the competitive structure of the relevant market to ascertain whether Etix enjoyed a dominant position. To this end, the LCA made a distinction between the events organized at the Rockhal by entities other than CMA and those directly organized by CMA. CMA did not play any relevant role in the distribution of tickets for shows organized by other entities. Therefore, the LCA focused on the distribution of the tickets for the events organized by CMA. In that regard, the statements made by the CMA, confirmed by the evidence collected by the LCA, showed that only a variable share of the tickets for such events were marketed through the electronic platform owned by Etix. The remainder of those tickets were sold via alternative electronic and physical distribution channels, whose tickets fees were not determined by Etix.
Therefore, Etix did not have a monopoly position in the market for the sale of tickets for the events run at the Rockhal. On the contrary, in this market Etix had to face competition from several operators. From that the LCA reached the conclusion that CMA and Etix did not violate Article 102 TFEU and the corresponding provision in Article 5 of the Luxembourg Competition Law, closing the antitrust proceeding with a non-infringement decision.  
Curiously, this is the third time over the past months that the LCA started an antitrust investigation against CMA[2], though this time it was mainly the conducts of a supplier of CMA to give raise to the LCA’s competition concerns. That said, the LCA noted that, in the segment of the relevant market comprising the tickets for the events directly organized by CMA, it was the latter to decide how many tickets to allocate to each electronic platform, in addition to tickets that were sold by brick-and-mortar agents. Though the LCA did not indicate the market shares that Etix and the other on-line distributors had in this market segment, the position of Etix in such market was far from being that of a monopolist as feared by the undisclosed complainant. Therefore, the pricing policy followed Etix when determining the ticket fees to charge on CMA fell outside the reach of EU and Luxembourg competition provisions that prohibit abusive conducts of dominant firms.




Comments

Martine Pelosse said…
Bonjour tout le monde
Je m'appelle Mme Martine Pelosse , je vis au Québec et je suis une femme heureuse aujourd'hui. Ceci grace à un vrai preteur qui a sauvé ma famille et moi d'une situation financière très compliquée. Alors je recommande à toute personne recherchant un prêt vers lui , il m'a donné du bonheur à moi et ma famille, j'avais besoin d'un prêt de $ 300,000 pour les besoins de ma famille car je suis une veuve de quatre enfants . J'ai rencontré cet honnête prêteur qui m'a aidé avec un prêt de $300,000 , il est un homme craignant DIEU. Si vous avez besoin de prêt, s'il vous plait contactez-le, dites lui que Mme Pelosse qui vous a référé à lui. Contactez M. LAGACE par courriel : guylagaceloan@gmail.com

Bien à vous.
February 23, 2017 at 5:47 AM
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