The Italian Competition Authority targets two collusions in the corrugated cardboard sector

Following the receipt of several complaints, in the case I805, Intesa  nel settore del cartone ondulato e relative imballaggi ( http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/allegati-news/I805_avv.%20istrutt.pdf/download.html ), the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) opened an Article 101 TFEU investigation against several undertakings in corrugated cardboard sector. The ICA feared that the parties had implemented two collusion arrangements: one affecting the market for corrugated cardboard (the corrugated cardboard collusion) and one affecting the market for packaging made by corrugated cardboard (the packaging collusion).
The ICA believed that the SK group, Progest, Cartonstrong, the DS Smith group, the Laveggia group, Innova, Imballaggi Piemontesi, Ondulati Nordovest and Ondulati Friuli took part in the corrugated cardboard collusion on the ground of the following evidence and facts collected in the preliminary investigations. Since 2004 the parties have constantly applied the same list price (the 2004 list). Moreover, starting from 2012 the parties jointly decided the rebates to apply on the prices referred in the 2004 list. The rebates were apparently unconnected to the changes in the price of paper that was the main raw material for the manufacturing of corrugated cardboard. This was also the largest cost item for non-vertically integrated producers of packaging operating in the downstream market for the production and sale of packaging, whose requirements were supplied by the parties. Finally, the Commission believed that the parties had also limited the range of the types of corrugated cardboard, especially the most innovative ones, available for the non-vertically integrated producers of packaging. In practice, the corrugated cardboard collusion might have had horizontal anti-competitive effects in the market for the production and sale of corrugated cardboard and vertical anti-competitive effects in the downstream market for packaging. In this way, the collusion arrangement may discriminate non-vertically integrated producers of packaging on two key competition parameters of prices and output, favouring the vertically-integrated producers belonging to the parties.
The packaging collusion was believed to be implemented by the SK group, the group Progest, Cartonstrong, the DS Smith group, the Laveggia group, Ondulati Nordest, Ondulati Friuli, International Paper and the Sada group. The evidence collected by the ICA showed a number of meetings over the 2015-2016 period by which they coordinated the prices to apply to customers and how to allocate the market amongst them. The evidentiary pieces also showed the exchange of commercial sensitive information between the parties and a trade association (GIFCO).
In conclusion, the ICA had concerns that, by the packaging collusion and the corrugated cardboard collusion, the parties coordinated their commercial policies in the markets for corrugated cardboard and packaging with the aim to fixing prices and allocating market shares. Moreover, the sensitive information provided by GIFCO would enable the parties to monitor the colluders’ compliance with the collusive arrangements.
   

  


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