Are the conditions for the access to the profession of managers of the Italian football clubs anti-competitive?

This question is to be addressed by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) in an Article 101 TFEU investigation it opened in the Case I812 FIGC-Regolamentazione dell’attivitàdi direttore sportive-collaboratore della gestione sportive-osservatore calcisticoe match analyst. The ICA investigation focuses the conditions laid down by the 2015 regulation adopted by the Italian football association (FIGC) for the access to the professions of team managers (direttori sportive) for clubs admitted to professional leagues, junior team managers (collaborator della gestione sportive) for clubs playing in the amateur leagues and talent scouts.
The FIGC 2015 regulation allows only the persons registered with the special registries held by FIGC to perform the professions reported above. In order to be registered with the FIGC special registries, it is necessary to obtain a qualifying diploma by successfully attending one of the vocational courses organized, usually, each year by FIGC itself. On examining the admission requirements to those courses, the ICA had concerns that the 2015 Regulation could lessen the competition in the relevant market for the provision of the activities of team managers, junior team managers and talent scouts to football clubs. Because FIGC was an association of undertakings, regrouping football clubs and other entities involved in the organization of football events, its 2015 regulation was an agreement for the purpose of competition law. What attracted the ICA’s competition concerns was that the admission to the courses was restricted to those having the Italian citizenship or being an Italian residency; each course offers only a limited number of places to prospective students; FIGC was the exclusive provider of such vocational courses.
Though the ICA shared its concerns with FIGC, the above admission requirements were applied by FIGC on the latest courses. Moreover, in 2016 FIGC amended its 2015 Regulation requalifying the professions of talent scouts and match analysts as coaches, thereby being subjected to the restrictive regulation of Law no. 91/1981.
In conclusion, the ICA believed that the FIGC regulation and the requirements in the notices for the selection of the students to be admitted to the FIGC vocational courses are liable to restrict competition. Indeed, they may limit the numbers of those that are licensed to carry out the activities of team managers, junior team managers and talent scouts concerned profession. They also prevent those not having the Italian citizenship or residency and those not being enlisted in the special registries of the FIGC from performing the above activities.





Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Aspen: The Italian Competition Authority fines a generic manufacturer of drugs for excessive pricing

By the decision made on 29 September 2016 in Aspen [i] , the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has imposed a fine of more than EUR 5 million on the Aspen group (Aspen), a South African manufacturer of generic drugs. Aspen violated Article 102 TFEU by imposing excessive prices for the supply of the so-called ‘Cosmos drugs’. These drugs included Leukeran, Alkeran, Purinethol and Tioguanine, which included the active principles of chlorambucil, melphalan, mercaptopurine and tioguanine, respectively. All these drugs were used to treat cancer pathologies and included in a wider package of pharmaceutical products, whose marketing rights had been purchased by Aspen from the originator GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in 2009. Aspen had a dominant position in the relevant product markets for the commercialization of anti-cancer drugs manufactured using the active principles of alkeran, leukeran, purinethol and tioguanine. It had the only one market authorization for the sale of drugs and potential ...
Read more

Geographical allocation of turnover in aviation mergers: What the European Commission recently hold

The European Merger Control Regulation (ECMR) stipulates that only concentrations with a European dimension fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the European Commission to review. A concentration is presumed to have such a dimension when it meets the financial threshold in Article 1 of the ECMR. To this end, it is necessary to calculate the turnover generated by the merging parties within the Community or in one or more member states. However, the geographical allocation of the turnover required by Article 1 for the purpose to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction can be a tricky issue in case of mergers between undertakings with a cross-border activity such airliners. In fact, the activities of airlines span several countries as they typically operate flights and sell tickets in many national markets. Recently, the Commission has dealt with the issue at length in the Ryanair/Aer Lingus case. It identified three possible methodologies for geographical allocation of turnover: -...
Read more

The European Commission unconditionally clears the Facebook/WhatsApp merger

By a Phase I decision the Commission unconditionally approved the Facebook $ 19 billion acquisition of WhatsApp ( Case No COMP/M.7217,Facebook/WhatsApp) . The Commission was required by the parties to review the transaction by means of a reasoned submission filed on the basis of Article 4(5) of the EU Merger Regulation. Indeed, the merger was not a concentration with EU dimension within the meaning of Article 1 EUMR falling within the Commission jurisdiction, since the EU turnover of WhatsApp in 2013 failed to met the financial thresholds in that provision. The Commission identified three relevant product markets affected by the concentration. It restrained the first relevant market, the market for consumer communication services, to the communication apps for smartphones, because WhatsApp was available only for this device. Following its approach in Microsoft/Skype (Case M.6281), upheld by the General Court in the case T-79/12, Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission, the Com...
Read more