The Italian Competition Authority closes with a commitment decision an antitrust investigation in the market for local public transport services

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has closed by a commitment decision, made on 11 May 2017, the Article 102 TFEU investigation opened in the Case A496 Gara TPL Padova, against Busitalia Veneto (BV), Busitalia Sita Nord (BSN) and APS Holding (APS).
The ICA had concerns about two abusive conducts affecting the competitive tender procedure called for by the contracting authority, PP, for the selection of the supplier of the local public transport services in the territorial ambit of Padua. The first abusive conducts referred to BV failure to provide PP with the data regarding the tendered out services which were needed to draft the tender notice. The second abusive conduct was the BV threat to discontinue the selling of electronic tickets should PP refuse to authorize the price increase requested by BV.  
Following the opening of the antitrust investigation, in June 2016 the ICA adopted an interim decision ordering BV, BSN and APS to give PP the sought information. Complying with that order, in July 2016 the parties gave PP all the information it required about the above competitive procedure concerning the local transport services of the territorial ambit of Padua.
In addition to comply with the ICA interim order, BV and BSN also submitted a set of behavioural commitments to deal with the ICA’s competition concerns that also regarded future tender procedures in which the parties might make a bid. The commitments, once amended by the parties following the feedback of the market test, were approved and made binding by the ICA.
As for the first abusive conduct, the parties undertook to follow a binding time plan which details out the information to be transmitted, within the agreed deadlines, to the contracting authorities in charge for the supply of public transport services in the territorial ambits where the parties hold a concession. The parties also committed to timely inform the ICA about the adoption of time plans as well as the collection and transmission of the relevant information. Concerning the second abusive conduct, BV committed to refrain from asking for a price increase for the bus tickets sold via SMS and other electronic means.
The ICA favourably evaluated the time plan commitments offered by the parties. In its view, the time plan ensures that the contracting authorities receive the relevant information in time to organize the competitive tender procedure before the expiry of the incumbent concession.  
A further aspect that is worth considering in Gara TPL Padova is the close connection between the obligations imposed on the parties by the ICA interim order and the commitments offered by BV and BSN. Indeed, the pieces of information that BV and BSN undertook to give in connection to future tender procedures to be called for the renew of the concessions for the provision of local public service transports, previously held by them, substantially correspond to the information that the parties transmitted to PP in compliance with the ICA interim order. That should assuage the ICA’s concerns that the parties might replicate in future the abusive conducts similar to those examined in Gara TPL Padova.


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