The Italian Competition Authority targets an RPM concerning online sales of stoves

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has closed by a commitment decision an antitrust investigation into allegedly anticompetitive restraints affecting the online markets for the commercialization of stoves[1]. The restrictive practices considered by the ICA in Stove online sales restraints were resale price maintenance (RPM) and territorial restriction arrangements.

The facts of the case
The target of the ICA investigation was the commercial policies adopted by Cadel Srl (Cadel) and MCZ Group Spa (MCZ), which belonged to Zanette Group Spa (ZG), in relation to the online distribution channel. MCZ was a European major producer of biomass heaters, while Cadel was a producer of wood stoves and pallet stoves. The ICA started its investigation following the receipt of a complaint lodged by an online distributor.
The relevant product market affected by the commercial policies of Cadel and MCZ was the market for the manufacture and the online sales of wood and pellet stoves and kitchens. More specifically, the ICA concerns about the following commercial terms adopted by the parties: i) imposition of minimum resale prices; ii) limitations on the validity of warranties for the goods sold overseas; and iii) no delivery outside Italy of goods sold online. The ICA feared that the above terms breached Article 101 TFEU by restricting price competition among distributors of the contractual goods as well as hindering the online marketing of such products.

The commitments of the parties and the decision of the ICA
To resolve the competition problems raised by the ICA, the parties proposed the following set of commitments: i) to refrain from determining the pricing policies of the distributors, comprising online resale prices, and from limiting the modalities of online marketing of the contractual products; ii) to not recommend for a period of two years resale prices and iii) to send distributors policy documents outlining the absolute freedom of distributors to set resale price, market and deliver the products abroad.
The ICA subjected the set of commitments to a market test though, curiously, it received no feedback. In the ICA’s view the proposed commitments were suitable to ensure that distributors had the effective freedom to set resale prices and to reach a wide range of overseas customers. The parties reserved the power to modify the modalities of sale and marketing adopted by distributors where necessary to provide customers with information about the installation of stoves. The ICA considered this clause as necessary to guarantee the safety of consumers.
Therefore, the ICA accepted and made binding the commitments proposed by the parties and closed the proceedings.

Conclusion
The Stove online sales restraints case well illustrates that the ICA is ready to close antitrust investigation, even those concerning very serious competition breaches as RPM and territorial restrictions, by accepting the commitments offered by the parties.



  

  

 

[1] Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, decision no. 27142 of 18 April 2018, Case I813, Restrizioni alle vendite online di stufe (Stove online sales restraint).


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