The Italian Competition Authority to investigate into bid rigging practice in the ICT sector


By a decision made on 17 July 2019 in the case I833 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has opened an Article 101 TFEU investigation against four suppliers of ICT goods and services (Converge, Italware, Computer Gross and Zucchetti). These firms were alleged to have coordinated their conducts in relation to three competitive tender procedures organized in the 2015-2017 period by Consip, the central purchasing body for the Italian public administration, for the award of several contracts for the purchase of PC desktops and related services.
The ICA decided to start the procedure following the receipt of a report prepared by the financial police on the offers submitted by the parties in response to the Consip’s tender notices. All the lots put on tender by Consip but one, for which the winner was Zucchetti, were awarded to Converge and Italware. Some aspects of the bidding patterns of the parties drew the attention of the ICA that considered them as indicia of a collusive agreement.
First, during the period of time under examination, the parties submitted bids with different economic terms for similar lots. Apparently, these conducts are inconsistent with the objective to genuinely compete in a tender procedure for the award of public contracts. Indeed, bidders are generally aware of the prices and rebates they can quote in their bids to have reasonable chances to be selected by the contracting authorities.
Second, though the parties were the licensees of the major vendors of hardware and software products, there was no overlapping in their bids. Where the products of a given brands offered by a party were chosen by Consip, the other parties refrained from making an offer that included products of the same brand. Acting in this way, the parties would have reduced the intrabrand competition in connection to each tender procedure. Again, these conducts have no plausible explanation but for a collusion.
Therefore, the ICA took the position that parties may have put in place a horizontal agreement aimed at allocating the lots put on tender by Consip. This collusive arrangement may have been facilitated by the structural links between Zucchetti and Italware and also by the links with manufacturers and distributor of hardware and software products.

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