competitionlaw

The French Competition Authority -Autoritè de la Concurrence- or FCA has recently published its opinion on competition effects that category management arrangements are expected to have ( Avis n. 10-A-25 of 7 December 2010 ) . Apart from the recent European Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, which contains a brief section on competition impact of category management, this is the first time that a European competition regulator deals at length with the issue of the implications that reliance on this marketing tool may have on competition in retail markets. The opinion of the FCA, however, must be read with the caveat that its assessment was focused, logically, on the likely effects of category management in the French retail markets. In this regard, it notes that within the category management arrangement used in the French market retailers keep the last word on their marketing policies, while the captain only gives non-binding recommendations to them. Importantly, this t...

By a recent judgment, case no. 5984/2010, Enel Rete Gas Spa v Comune di Uboldo , consistently with its case law, the Council of State confirmed that under the transitory period in Legislative Decree 164/2000 the service concessions for the distribution of natural gas automatically extended. Legislative Decree 164/2000, which implement into Italian legal system the Gas Directive 2003/55/EC provided for a five-year transitional period starting from 31 December 2004. This period was aimed at enabling the parties to service concessions in force on the date of the enactment of Legislative Decree 164/2000 to comply with the new regime. The transitional period applied to service concessions for distribution of natural gas awarded before the Decree. This period automatically extended if the concession-holder met certain dimensional thresholds before 31 December 2004. In the Rete Gas Spa v Comune di Uboldo case, the appealed, Municipality of Uboldo (the Municipality), had awarded the appellant...

The Italian Competition Authority or AGCM has condemned 26 pasta makers and two industry associations for having put in place price-fixing practices in the market for durum semolina pasta. The cartel was aimed at coordinating increases in selling in prices of pasta the cartelists applied to supermarket chains over the October 2006-March 2008 period. In this way, the pasta producers tried to protect their margins which were squeezed between the buyer power of supermarket chains and the rising prices of ingredients to make pasta. The most important finding of the AGCM decision was that the supermarket chains had a relevant buyer power that they could exert with regard to any pasta producers, regardless of their size. And, accordingly, the only way for pasta manufacturers to counter the buyer power of supermarket chains was to develop a common pricing policy and jointly implement it. Though, so the AGCM argument run, the more efficient pasta producers could react to increasing production...

Following the receipt of a complaint, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has opened an investigation into an alleged cartel affecting the market for shipping agency’ services (Case I733, Servizi di Agenzia Marittima) . On the basis of the facts set out in the complaint, the ICA alleged that the parties had implemented the cartel in a number of phases. First, through the meetings of a first professional association, Commissione Portuale di Assagenti, which was set up by shipping agencies operating in the port of Genoa, the parties agreed on the fees to charge for their services. The cartelized fees were the Manual Documentation Fees and the Open Documentation Fees. The parties recommended which fees charge on customers within the maximum and the minimum set by ministerial decrees. Second, Assagenti was given the task to convince another professional association, Spediporto, which was set up by couriers and shippers active at the port of Genoa, to apply the recommended fee...

The French Competition Authority (ADC) conditionally cleared the transaction by which the French incumbent train operator SNCF, through its subsidiary SNCF-P, and the Caisse de Dépôt et Placements du Québec (CDPQ) would jointly acquire the control on the bus operator Keolis and Effiae, a transport consultancy). The concentration was originally notified to the European Commission. Believing that the concentration would only have effects on French national markets, the ADC filed a request for a referral of the case pursuant to Article 9 (2) (a) of EC Regulation 139/2004. The Commission found that the notified concentration affected a number of markets for passenger transport services and for auxiliary services having only a French dimension. The Commission considered that the ADC had already reached a considerable knowledge of the affected markets through the enquiry into the competition issues regarding intermodal passenger transport. Therefore, it decided to refer the concentratio...

Over the 2005-2007 period Billa bought seven supermarkets in the Milan area from an Italian retailer, Esselunga. Each of these transactions amounted to a concentration under the Italian merger control law. Because all the transactions exceeded the statutory financial threshold, the buyer was subject to the pre-emptive notification obligation laid down by Article 16 of the Act 287/90. However, Billa notified the transactions to the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) only after having implemented them. The AGCM found the Billa late notifications to be in breach of the compulsory notification obligation and imposed on it a fine of Euro 30.000,00 ( case C10380, Billa/& Punti Vendita Esselunga ). In determining the fine, the AGCM took into account that Billa did not voluntarily infringe the Article 16 notification obligation, but it only erred in interpreting the scope of obligation. A further relevant element was the fact that Billa spontaneously notified the transaction once it ...

According to the European Commission’s definition, category management is an agreement by which, within a distribution agreement, the distributor entrusts the supplier or category captain with the marketing of a category of products. It is still uncertain which effects on competition category management may have. On one hand, it may improve economic efficiency by enabling producers to have a better understanding of consumers' needs. On the other hand, such agreement may drive category captains’ competitors off the market. Moreover, category management allows exchange of sensitive data which may facilitate collusion between producers or between producers and supermarket chains. The US antitrust community has already examined the above issues and the US antitrust authorities had already dealt with category management in the US Tobacco and Gruma Corporation cases. Across the Atlantic also the debate on the competition impact of category management is gaining momentum with the European...